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MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED
BY HIS PRODUCTS: DEFECTIVE AUTOMOBILES*

Lester W. Feezert

W

HEN a manufactured article fails to meet the reasonable expectations of the purchaser-user and in consequence he suffers
personal injury or property damage, is the manufacturer responsible?
When the user purchases from the manufacturer, so that there is privity
of contract and the formulated concepts of sales and warranty law are
available, we have a relatively simple situation which it is not the
primary purpose of this paper to discuss. The common-law concepts for
dealing with such problems seem to have been formulated in times when
this privity element was usually present, and it is therefore not a matter
of wonder that the privity element came to be regarded as necessary.
Manufacture was not on a mass basis in those days. Even coffins were
made to order. The user ordered the thing he wanted and it was made
accordingly. There was direct dealing, i.e., privity between maker and
prospective user; and, if the article was not up to expectations and
caused the purchaser harm, he could sue the maker for breach of the
agreement and recover appropriate damages in accordance with the
terms of the agreement, express or implied. As a feature of contracts
of sale, there came in time to be recognized a seller's obligation
described by the word "warranty." 1 Such obligations or warranties

*

The writer desires to acknowledge the assistance of one of his students, Mr.
Philo Hall at the University of South Dakota Law School who did a tremendous amount
of leg work and who is entirely responsible for some of the footnotes.
Professor of Law, University of Arizona. B.Sc., Grinnell College; LL.B.,
Harvard; author of numerous articles in legal periodicals.-Ed.
1 As to what is a warranty, there are innumerable definitions. ln this study we are
interested only in sellers' warranties and, among those, chiefly in warranties of quality.
For definitions, see VoLD, SALES, § 140 ( 1931). Professor Veld's "black letter" definition is as follows: "A seller's warranty in connection with a contract to sell or a
sale of goods is an obligation, incidental to the transaction, that the seller shall be
answerable for various matters relating to the goods. The scope of the warranty may
vary, depending on the circumstances, such as the terms of the seller's actual promises,
express or inferred in fact, the seller's express or tacit representations of fact serving
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might be expressed in the contract; but the law also attached duties as
incidental to the sale, varying with the nature of the subject matter,
which were known as implied warranties. The limits of this field of
implied warranty are yet not clearly defined. 2 The pull of conflicting
social and economic pressures and other factors continue to influence
the courts in deciding these cases, thus producing asymmetry from time
to time and place to place.
In general, the common law has been somewhat chary of implied
warranty. There has been no general implied warranty as to the quality
of goods already in existence, if the buyer is given an opportunity to
inspect. However, there have been important exceptions. For example,
when an article was to be made to order for a use known to the seller,
then there was an implied warranty that it should be fit for the purpose
for which such an article is generally used or for which it was specially
made. 8 Also, the manner in which the parties dealt had a bearing on the
nature and extent of the warranty. The fact of buyer's reliance on
seller's description, plus seller's knowledge of such reliance, was important. Then, too, there came into being an implied warranty of the
quality of food for household use.4
as inducements to the bargain, and broader considerations of policy. The warranty
obligation may thus be either promissory in its nature, or independently imposed by law,
or both."
In l WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed., § 195 (1924), Professor Williston points out
that the action upon a warranty originated as tort but today is generally conceived of
as contractual. Ibid., § 197: "A positive representation of fact is enough to render him
[ the seller] liable. The distinction between warranty and representation which is
important in some branches of the law is not appropriate here. The representation of
fact which induces a bargain is a warranty. • •• As an actual agreement to contract is
not essential, the obligation of the seller in such a case is one imposed by law..•• that
this point of view has been lost sight of by some courts is no doubt due to the fact
that assumpsit became so generally the remedy for the enforcement of a warranty. But
even at the present time an action of tort for warranty still lies irrespective of any
fraud on the part of the seller or knowledge on his part that the representations constituting the warranty were untrue." See also 4 W1LLIST0N, CONTRACTS, rev. ed.,
§ 968 et seq. (1936).
2
VOLD, SALES, § 140 (1931); LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
LAW OF SALES 204 (1930); Bogert and Fink, "Business Practice Regarding Warranties
in the Sale of Goods," 25 ILL. L. REv. 400 at 410 (1931), where it is pointed out
that so far as express warranty goes, the standard manufacturers' warranty clause "is
a guaranty for a limited period against defects in the materials or workmanship of the
goods sold by the manufacturer, the sole or a supplementary remedy for breach usually
being repair or replacement of the defective part on certain conditions." .As to the
history of implied warranty of quality, see l WILLISTON, SALES, § 228 ( 1924).
3
VoLD, SALES, § 147 (1931); 1 W1LLISTON, SALES, 2d ed., § 237 (1924);
Uniform Sales Act, § 15.
4
VoLD, SALES 464-465 (1931); l WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed., §§ 241, 242,
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In studying the broad question of a manufacturer's responsibility
to consumers, there are at least two very important reasons why the
law about warranty cannot be ignored. In the first place, the notion of
privity tied in with warranty has been an effective check on the ability
of the judicial process to meet modern conditions even in the cases
where negligence is present. 5 In the second place, the legal problems
arising from the function of manufacturers in the modern social organization cannot be handled adequately on the basis of negligence alone.
Proof of negligence is impossible in many cases where human nature
instinctively senses obligation. Moreover, manufacturers' representations to distant, unknown, possible consumers through advertising
broadcast to them by such means as nationally circulated magazines,
radio and highway billboards, ought to entail responsibility. 6 In such
242a (1924); Perkins, "Unwholesome Food as a Source of Liability," 5 lowA L. BuL.
6, 86 (1919-1920); 5 A. L. R. 248 (1920); 13 A. L. R. u76 (1921); 39 A. L. R.
1000 (1925). It does not seem worth while to collect considerable numbers of cases
in these footnotes; they are legion and will be found collected in the secondary sources
herein referred to. They represent multiple variants of the problem and naturally
enough are not all reconcilable.
5
l WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed., § 195 (1924); Williston, "Liability for Honest
Misrepresentation," 24 HARV. L. REv. 4 l 5 ( l 91 l), developing more fully the history
of this evolution; Ames, "The History of Assumpsit," 2 HARV. L. REv. 1, 53 (1888).
l STREET, THE FouNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 379 (1906), says: "If there is
any principle which in theory and in practice has given satisfaction to the English
and American judicial mind, it is the principle that the seller of a chattel is liable
to the purchaser only when he is guilty of a fraud or breach of warranty." This was
closely associated with the notion of privity as a necessary basis for liability. On the
other hand, says Professor Bohlen in "Fifty Years of Torts," 50 HARv. L. REv. 725,
1225 at 1232-1233 (1937): "Privity is no longer the fetish it was fifty years ago.
Yet while on the wane, it still has vitality•••. Thus, lack of privity has been used
to deny liability to one other than the immediate purchaser who was injured by the
defective condition of a negligently manufactured chattel." After other illustrations
of the operation of the privity doctrine he continues, "In the first field at least the
opinion of Judge Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., has given to privity
what may be hoped will prove a mortal wound." Mr. Bohlen says in his next paragraph that he does not advocate that a negligent man should be held answerable for every
sort of harm which would not have occurred but for his neglect, but he does think the
shibboleth of privity should be abolished.
6
While the manufacturer invariably invokes the doctrine of privity as his defense
when an action is brought for injury, he does not look upon the consumer as a remote
stranger when he is dealing with minor complaints which can be satisfied by replacements or repairs. It is only when the dispute reaches such proportions as to lead the
parties to consult their lawyers that the manufacturer discovers that his consumers are
strangers. Witness the letters which automobile manufacturers send out to purchasers of
cars as soon as the dealer has reported the sale. The article by Bogert and Fink,
"Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods," 25 ILL. L. REv. 400
at 416 (1931), says of the manufacturer's attitude towards his relationship with
consumers, "the practice among manufacturers and dealers with regard to the operation
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cases privity again stands in the path, a more stubborn bete noir than
when the negligence approach is followed. An alternative approach in
many such cases is an action in deceit. How effective this branch of the
law will be in allocating losses occasioned by manufactured goods will
depend largely upon the concept of deceit in the locale, particularly
the attitude toward "scienter." 7 Deceit may mean conscious fraud or
of the manufacturer's warranty against defects in material and workmanship is that
the complaints are satisfied either by the manufacturer directly or through the agency
of the dealer. The manufacturer assumes that he is directly liable to the user. If the
complaint goes through the dealer, it is for convenience's sake. The dealer does not
regard himself as having any personal responsibility. All parties regard him as a conduit
or intermediary for adjustment purposes, even though he has himself warranted the
goods and sold them as his own. These facts manifest a practical repudiation by the
manufacturers and dealers of the legalistic notion that warranties of personal property
should be effective only between parties in privity of contract. Business practice in
this regard is in accord with the minority of American courts, and may, if supported
by other commercial usage, justify an overthrow of the majority privity of contract
theory. Such a result would be another praiseworthy assimilation of the law of real
and personal property."
7 Deceit, the special adaptation of the action on the case which developed as a
tort action, without reference to the existence of any contract relation between the
parties to the action, and in the form familiar to us today as an independent tort action,
goes back to Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51, 1qo Eng. Rep. 450 (1789). This action
depended upon the presence of certain elements variously stated but comprehended
within the following: (I) false representation of fact ( 2) fraudulently made, ( 3) under
circumstances which entitled the plaintiff to rely thereon, (4) the plaintiff did rely
thereon, (5) to his damage. While these several elements are variables, they are nevertheless limitations upon the scope of the action. The most important limitation on the
use of deceit in actions by users against manufacturers is that covered by the second
of these elements: when is a representation "fraudulently made," when is there such
"scienter" as to make one guilty of deceit? It may mean in different parts of the
legal world anything from the conscious fraud required by the House of Lords in
Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889), through a range of modifications in the
states of this country to those which hold that a statement of fact which is capable
of accurate ascertainment, if made by one as of his own knowledge, will render the
speaker liable, if it turns out to be false, and one, properly relying and acting thereon,
is damaged thereby. For collection of many cases, see such sources as Williston, "Liability
for Honest Misrepresentation," 24 HARV. L. REv. 415 (19n).
There has been much discussion in late years as to whether liability should be
imposed for negligent misrepresentation. There are scattered cases so holding, including
a group in New York, a jurisdiction which has insisted that deceit means conscious falsehood. This tendency to impose liability for negligent misrepresentation in New York
seems to have been checked since Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174
N.E. 441 (193 I).Aspate of writing upon this topic has brought out a number of strongly
conflicting opinions in the exposition of which there has been generated some heat.
As to which develops the more light, the reader may judge for himself. Smith, "Liability for Negligent Language," 14 HARV. L. REv. 184 (1900); Williston, "Liability
for Honest Misrepresentation," 24 HARV. L. REv. 415 (1911); Bohlen, "Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty," 42 HARV. L. REv. 733 (1929);
Carpenter, "Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentation,"
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mere negligent misrepresentation or some elusive in-between. Except
in so far as it may become pertinent in the discussion of particular cases,
the present paper will not undertake to explore this vast territory.
It would be gratifying to begin to take up at this point the particular
subject of automobiles towards which this is intended to lead; but the
background is so large and has been so well sketched by Karl Llewellyn
that the reader cannot fail to be helped on his way through what follows by another reading of at least part of what Professor Llewellyn
has said in his Casebook on Sales:
"The law of seller's obligation as to quality ('warranty')
presents the sweep of sales law in its most dramatic form. The
picture begins in terms of a community whose trade is only one
step removed from barter. . . . Two vital presuppositions reign:
first, that the goods in question are there to be seen; second, either
that everybody knows everybody's goods, individually, in a faceto-face, closed, stable group; or that trade with strangers in a shop
is an arm's length proposition, with wits matched against skill.
In either event, only a fool believes anything he hears. . •• Manufactured goods are handicraft articles, made by some one you
know, and for the most local of markets.
"Out of this we move gradually into a credit and industrial
economy. . .. Markets widen with improved transportation....
Sellers begin to build for good will, in wide markets, to feel their
standing behind goods to be no hardship. • . . The law of seller's
obligation must change, to suit.
"And the conceptual growth is as striking as the shift from
seller's to buyer's protection." 8
"Meantime another line of seller's obligation was developing
24 ILL. L. REV. 749 (1930); Green, "Deceit," 16 VA. L. REv. 749 (1930)
reprinted in GREEN, JuDGE AND JURY, c. IO (1930); Weisiger, "Bases of Liability
for Misrepresentation," 24 ILL. L. REv. 866 (1930); Bohlen, "Should Negligent
Misrepresentations be Treated as Negligence or Fraud?" 18 VA. L. REv. 703 (1932);
Green, "Innocent Misrepresentation," 19 VA. L. REv. 242 (1932).
Professor Williston, in his article just above cited, favors strict liability for misrepresentations inducing the sale of goods, saying [ 24 HARV. L. REv. 415 at 437,
419 (19n)]: "If a man makes a statement in regard to a matter upon which his
hearer may reasonably suppose he has the means of information, and that he is speaking
with full knowledge, and the statement is made as a part of a business transaction, or
to induce action from which the speaker expects to gain an advantage, he should be
held liable for his misstatement. • .• it is law, nearly, if not quite everywhere where
the common law prevails, that any representation of fact as to the quality of goods made
for the apparent purpose of inducing the buyer to purchase them amounts to a warranty."
See note 25, infra, as to deceit in connection with Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,
168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409 (1932).
8
LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 204 (1930).
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... focused in the concept of 'fitness for a particular purpose.' It
has to do with purchase for final consumption. ... Even while
buyer and seller still dealt largely at arm's length, this type of
liability was pretty largely recognized-at least to the extent of
requiring 'due care' of the manufacturer, and even of the dealer,
who sold to an outsider. . .. with the growing specialization of
industry comes the complete dependence of the . . . consumer
upon the wares put into a national market. . .. consumer has neither
skill nor means of testing the wares before use. He buys and uses,
he must buy and use, at hazard of his skin. . .. What is wanted is
to protect the consumer dependent on a producer who is a stranger,
or even anonymous. That needed protection is twofold: to shift
the immediate incidence of the hazard of life in an industrial
society away from the individual over to a group which can distribute the loss; and to place the loss where the most pressure
will be exerted to keep down future losses. . . . And it is desired
to do this in the quickest, least expensive, most effective way. . ..
Obviously, the place of primary incidence should, then, be the
group which is in substantial control of the production. The first
group liable, to any consumer, should be the manufacturer. ...
The consumer, barring his own fault in use, should have no negligence to prove; ·that the article was not up to its normal character
should be enough. Advertisements should be responsible affirmations of normal character. ... Under such an ideal system of law
the loss would lie ultimately where it belongs, on the consumers
of the article concerned en masse [italics added], in competition
with other articles each carrying its own true costs in human life
and effort. . ..
"The actual decisions have moved from problem to problem
one by one. The tools were two: liability in negligence, with the
tendency to constantly raise the degree of care required, and to
constantly decrease the extent of proof required to get to the jury.
. . . And warranty. The emotional drive and appeal of the cases
centers in the stomach. The negligence line begins with belladonna
masquerading as dandelion extract. The warranty line finds some
historical support in the ancient law of food; it waxes great by way
of glass in beverages or bread, and poisonous meat. . . . But the
development is not confined to this, its center. It spreads to cover
other hazards to consumers." 9
Professor Llewellyn has outlined the situation. This paper seeks
to inquire how the courts have applied these various concepts in meet9 LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES

340-342 (1930).
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ing the problem of the automobile. References must be made here and
there to cases involving other sorts of manufactured articles but these
will be limited to instances when it is believed that the analogies they
furnish are pertinent and cogent.
This discussion as to automobiles must begin with a horse and buggy
case decided in 1842, Winterbottom v. Wright. 10 In this case the declaration stated that the defendant had a contract with the postmaster
general to supply coaches for carrying the mails over a certain route.
Under this contract the defendant undertook to keep the coaches in
repair. Plaintiff was a driver in the employ of one who had a separate
contract with the postmaster general to furnish horses and driver and
operate the coach. The plaintiff further declared that he relied on the
defendant's contract to provide a safe coach. It was also alleged that
defendant had in fact furnished a coach having certain latent defects
of which plaintiff did not know. The coach broke down and plaintiff
was injured. A demurrer to this complaint was properly enough sustained, because the plaintiff was not a party to this contract and there
was of course no third party beneficiary aspect possible. The court
added:
"The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those
who enter into the contract...." 11
This statement, not necessary to the decision and purely dictum, has,
however, been the refuge of every court desiring to hold the obligation
of manufacturers within the limits fixed for it in times of such simple
marketing procedures as those referred to by Professor Llewellyn in
the extract quoted above. As the reader of course knows, this doctrine
of Winterbottom v. Wright became riddled with exceptions which were
the expression of the well realized but judicially concealed truth that
the rule of non-liability for negligent manufacturers would no longer
serve. 12 Then in 1916 Justice Cardozo, at that time a judge of the New
10

M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1909).
M. & W. at II l. The attorney for the defendant, whom the court upheld,
had stated the rule: "wherever a wrong arises merely out of the breach of a contract, which is the case on the face of this declaration, whether the form in which
the action is conceived be ex contractu or ex delicto, the party who made the contract
alone can sue."
w Huset v. Case Threshing Mach. Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1903) 120 F. 865. The
statement of the rule, with a summary of the exceptions as stated by Sanborn, J., in
his opinion, has been the classic test for innumerable cases for thirty-five years which
have elapsed. Sanborn puts the exception thus (120 F. at 870-871): "The first is that
an act of negligence of a manufacturer or vendor which is imminently dangerous to
the life or health of mankind, and which is committed in the preparation or sale of an
IO
11 IO
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York Court of Appeals, cleared the air to a considerable extent by his
opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.18 The scope of the rule of
this famous case is probably adequately stated and limited in this
sentence:
A manufacturer owes the affirmative obligation to employ reasonable care in the manufacture or assembling of chattels which, while
not necessarily dangerous if properly constructed, constitute a
menace to life and limb if not carefully made; and this duty is
owed not only to his immediate vendee but to anyone likely to
be harmed by the defective article while the same is being lawfully
used for the purpose intended.
Thus, in effect Justice Cardozo defined the duty of manufacturers as to
subvenclees and other third persons injured by negligently made automobiles. He made it clear that the manufacturer has duties not based
upon his contract of sale with the dealers, who after all are unlikely
to encounter any substantial hazard from negligent defects in the cars
they sell to others. This decision properly defined the manufacturer's
duty in terms of the problem before the court and perhaps too
cautiously applied that test of liability only to things menacing to
health and life.14
article intended to preserve, destroy, or affect human life, is actionable by third parties
who suffer from the negligence. • •• The second exception is that an owner's act of
negligence which causes injury to one who is invited by him to use his defective
appliance upon the owner's premises may form the basis of an action against the owner•
• • . The third exception to the rule is that one who sells or delivers an article which
he knows to be imminently dangerous to life or limb to another without notice of its
qualities is liable to any person who suffers an injury therefrom which might have been
reasonably anticipated, whether there were any contractual relations between the parties
or not."
13 217 N. Y. 382, I I I N. E. 1050 (1916).
14 ln Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N. Y. 292 at 295, 181 N. E. 576 (1932),
the New York Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of the Buick case to the manufacturer of a soda water bottle and considering the question which was mentioned by
Judge Cardozo but not settl~d, as to whether the maker of a component part would
be liable as the Buick Co. was, in the light of subsequent decisions said, "There emerges
we think, a broad rule of liability applicable to the manufacturer of any chattel, whether
it be a component part or an assembled entity. Stated with reference to the facts of
this particular case, it is that if either defendant was negligent in circumstances pointing to an unreasonable risk of serious bodily injury to one in plaintiff's position, liability may follow though privity is lacking."
These questions are dealt with in 2 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, c. 14, § 388-408
(1934), "Liability of Persons Supplying Chattels for the use of Others." See particularly in connection with the problem under discussion, § 395, which approximately
states the rule of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., as it is laid down in Cardozo's
opinion, viz., "A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufac-
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The idea which the MacPherson case gave to the legal world has
not been accepted in all jurisdictions,15 but it has found a cordial reception in many jurisdictions and is probably one of the most quoted and
cited cases of its time. It has replaced Winterbottom v. Wright and
its brood of exceptions in a considerable number of states; and where
it has not been accepted thus, it has nevertheless been influential in
extending the obligation of the manufacturer by enlarging the list
of recognized exceptions. There is an increasing number of cases from
year to year extending the MacPherson case rule to include instances
of property damage as well as personal injuries.16 Along with this
recognition of a duty under the law of negligence there has been an
extension of res ipsa loquitur to make it possible for the plaintiff to
establish the necessary negligence. 11
ture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as involving an
unreasonable risk of causing substantial bodily harm to those who lawfully use it for a
purpose for which it is manufactured and to those whom the supplier should expect
to be in the vicinity of its probable use, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused
to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for which it is manufactured."
The present writer has elsewhere undertaken to point out that the law of torts had gone
beyond the scope of this rule at the time the Restatement was issued._ Feezer, "Tort
Liability of Manufacturers," 19 MINN. L. REv. 752 (1935). The Baxter case is likewise approved by Prof. Norman Latham of Ohio State University Law School in his
article "Sales," 35 Omo JURISPRUDENCE 645 at 887 (1934).
15
Bohlen, "Fifty Years of Torts," 50 HARV. L. REv. 725, 1225 at 1234 (1937).
Professor Bohlen says, "Judge Cardozo's opinion cuts through fallacious and arbitrary
distinctions and goes to the very root of the problem. Admirable as is the result, convincing as is the reasoning, the doctrine in that case has not gained the acceptance
which its merits deserve."
16
Feezer, "Tort Liability of Manufacturers," 19 MINN. L. REv. 752 (1935),
and various law review notes therein cited, particularly 3 1 MicH. L. REv. 264 ( 193 2) ;
14 MINN. L. REV. 306 (1929).
17 ln the cases involving unwholesome food and injurious foreign material in food,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been extended farthest as a basis of proving negligence of a manufacturer not in privity with an injured consumer. See note I 8, infra.
But the doctrine has also been used in the cases involving the explosion of bottled
beverages to the injury of a person not in privity with the manufacturer. Payne v.
Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co., IO Ga. App. 762, 73 S. E. 1087 (1912); Atlanta CocaCola Bottling Co. v. Danneman, 25 Ga. App. 43, l02 S. E. 542 (1920); Riecke v.
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn., 206 Mo. App. 246, 227 S. W. 631 (1921); Stolle
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 307 Mo. 520, 271 S. W. 497 (1925); Atlanta Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Shipp, 41 Ga. App. 705, 154 S. E. 385 (1930); Goldman &
Freiman Bottling Co. v. Sindell, 140 Md. 488, II7 A. 866 (1922); Macon Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Crane, 55 Ga. App. 573, 190 S.E. 879 (1937); Georgia-Alabama CocaCola Bottling Co. v. White, 55 Ga. App. 706, 191 S. E. 265 (1937).
In cases involving other defective chattels, there has been little disposition to
extend the doctrine. This is illustrated in connection with automobiles in Rotche v.
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There has also been a rather special development with reference
to food stuffs. Res ipsa loquitur has been given extremely free field in
these cases and there are also cases which allow the plaintiff to recover
against the manufacturer for injuries due to spoiled foods and food
containing deleterious foreign substances without the allegation
of negligence.18 These cases furnish a convenient stepping stone for the
Buick Motor Co., 358 Ill. 507, 193 N.E. 529 (1934) i Amason v. Ford Motor Co., (C.
C. A. 5th, 1935) So F. (2d) 265; Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., (C. C. A. 6th,
1930) 44 F. (2d) 310. Other illustrations are Pariser v. Wappler Electric Co., Inc.,
145 Misc. 315, 260 N. Y. S. 35 (1932), involving an injurious hair remover; Karr
v. Inecto, Inc., 247 N. Y. 360, 160 N. E. 398 (1928), poisonous hair dye; Ford
Motor Co. v. Wolbar, (C. C. A. 7th, 1929) 32 F. (2d) 18, res ipsa loquitur held
inapplicable when tractor turned over backward on driver; certiorari denied, 280
U.S. 565, 50 S. Ct. 25 (1929).
18 Some of the more recent cases have extended the theory of warranty so that it
runs with the goods in cases involving injury to subsequent parties through the use of
unwholesome food. In Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 163 Miss. 426 at 433, 141 So.
762 (1932), finding liability on the basis of implied warranty in favor of a consumer,
the court said, "The liability is not in tort and does not proceed upon the theory of
negligence." Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 lowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920);
Anderson v. Tyler, (Iowa 1937) 274 N. W. 48; Rainwater v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 131 Miss. 315, 95 So. 444 (1923); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons,
145 Miss. 876, I I l So. 305 ( 1927); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App.
475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928) (this case seems to go on the third party beneficiary theory);
Cantani v. Swift & Co., 2 5I Pa. 52, 9 5 A. 93 l ( l 9 l 5) ; Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933); Parks v. C. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334,
144 P. 202 (1914).
In applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in food cases, the courts have
allowed juries to impose liability upon very slight evidence. In Buffalo Rock Bottling
Co. v. Stephenson, 22 Ala. App. 605, II8 So. 498 (1928), the question of the bottler's
negligence was allowed to go to the jury on the evidence that the plaintiff vomited up
a roach after drinking a bottled beverage prepared by the defendant. See also 49 A.L.R.
592 (1927) for annotation on illness after partaking of food or drink as evidence of
negligence on the part of one who prepared or sold it. Where the evidence shows
foreign material found in the food although with no actual proof of negligence as to
its presence there, the doctrine of res ispsa loquitur is more generally applied. Chaproniere v. Mason, 21 T. L. R. 633 (1905), evidence merely showed plaintiff was
injured by biting a stone in a bun; Freeman v. Shultz Bread Co., 100 Misc. 528,
163 N. Y. S. 396 (1916), injury was shown from biting into bread containing nail;
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin, 246 Ky. 65, 54 S. W. (2d) 612 (1932),
evidence showed poisonous worm pressed into plug of chewing tobacco; Fisher v.
Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., (App. D. C. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 261,
105 A. L. R. 1034, mouldy substance in beverage; Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas,
236 Ky. 684, 33 S. W. (2d) 701 (1930), where a small package of arsenic was found
in the beverage.
Frequently several theories of liability are found discussed in the same case,
so that it is difficult to tell which the court is relying upon. Brown Cracker & Candy
Co. v. Jensen, (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 32 S. W. (2d) 227, is decided upon the
theories of negligence, breach of implied contract and misrepresentation. For collections
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inclusion of other manufactured articles in the same category. We have
now reached a point where we can no longer lean very heavily on
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 19 The language of that decision distinctly required negligence as an element of the plaintiff's case.
As the Buick case was unquestionably a landmark, it is likewise
possible that Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,2° decided by the Supreme
Court of Washington in 1934, may be another. Here is a case which
has extended the automobile manufacturer's obligation without reference to negligence. The plaintiff Baxter purchased from the St. Johns
Motor Company, a retail dealer, an automobile made by the Ford
Motor Company, and represented in advertising matter furnished by
the maker as containing a windshield of "shatter-proof" glass. This
circular stated:
"All of the new Ford cars have a Triplex shatter-proof glass windshield-so made that it will not fly or shatter under the hardest
impact. This is an important safety factor because it eliminates
the dangers of flying glass-the cause of most of the injuries in
automobile accidents. In these days of crowded, heavy traffic,
the use of this Triplex glass is an absolute necessity."
The windshield was struck by a pebble thrown by the tire of a
passing car, a bit of glass was chipped off and entered the plaintiff's
eye. Plaintiff sued both dealer aJiJ.d manufacturer. As to the dealer it
of cases showing the development of the manufacturer's liability, see 4 A. L. R. I 559
(1919); 17 A. L. R. 688 (1922); 39 A. L. R. 995 (1925); 47 A. L. R. 148
(1927); 63 A. L. R. 343 (1929); 88 A. L. R. 530 (1934); 98 A. L. R. 1496
(1935); 105 A. L. R. 1039 (1936); I II A. L. R. 1239 (1937).
Of course the traditional doctrine that warranties do not run with personal
property still remains the rule in many if not the majority of states. A typical recent
case expressing the conservative view is Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., 166 Va. 314
at 324, 186 S. E. 94 (1936), in which was held that a son could not recover on implied
warranty from the dairy which sold milk to his father. This is a representative case
expressing the conservative view, which the court summarized as follows:
"(1.) A dealer who sells unwholesome foodstuff for immediate consumption
is responsible for any ill effects which may follow therefrom. He is liable for the
results of any negligent act of his which should reasonably have been anticipated
by a prudent man, and he is also liable on an implied warranty.
"(2.) For negligence he must be sued in tort. On an implied warranty he
must be sued on contract. • • •
"(3.) For negligence he is liable to one whose hurt could reasonably have
been anticipated.
"On contract he is liable to his vendee but not to sub-vendees or others."
19 217 N. Y. 382, III N. E. 1050 (1916), discussed at note 13, supra.
20
168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409, 88 A. L. R. 521 (1932), rehearing denied
15 P. (2d) 1118 (1932).
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was held that inasmuch as the written contract of sale ( a form supplied
by the Ford Motor Company) by its terms stated that it contained the
entire contract and also that "It is further agreed that no warranty
either express or implied is made by the dealer under this order or
otherwise covering said car," therefore, under the parole evidence rule
it was incorrect to admit in evidence the printed advertising matter.
As to the Ford Motor Company, this printed matter was excluded
in the trial court, the case taken from the jury, and a verdict directed
for the defendant. This was reversed on appeal and a new trial ordered.
Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff at the second trial was again
appealed from and the state supreme court affirmed the judgment for
plaintiff.
The theory of the case is not entirely clear. 21 There was no allegation of negligence. In the opinion in the second appeal 22 the court said
of its previous holding,
"In that decision, we held that, in an action for breach of warranty of non-shatterable glass in a windshield, catalogs and printed
statements furnished the dealer for sales assistance are admissible
against the manufacturer, although there was no privity of contract, since the falsity of the representations could not be readily
detected; and that, in an action for a breach of warranty of nonshatterable glass in a windshield, plaintiff is entitled to show his
absence of familiarity with non-sh~tterable glass, and that he had
had no experience enabling him to recognize the difference between it and ordinary glass."
The Washington court, in Mazetti v. Armour & Co.,28 previously
had held the manufacturer of unwholesome food liable to a subvendee
for injury to his business as a result of having served this food in his
restaurant. In the Baxter case the court quoted from the Mazetti case
as follows:
"It has been accepted as a general rule that a manufacturer is
not liable to any person other than his immediate vendee; that the
action is necessarily one upon an implied or express warranty, and
that without privity of contract no suit can be maintained; that
each purchaser must resort to his immediate vendor. To this rule
certain exceptions have been recognized: (I) Where the thing
causing the injury is of a noxious or dangerous kind; (2) Where
21
22
23

See infra, page I 5 et seq.
179 Wash. 123 at 125, 35 P. (2d) 1090 (1934).
75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 213 (1915).

MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY

13

the defendant has been guilty of fraud or deceit in passing off the
article; (3) Where the defendant has been negligent in some
respect with reference to the sale or construction of a thing not
imminently dangerous." 24
The court also expressed the thought that due to the changing conditions of society, which had produced the three exceptions above mentioned, another should be added, saying:
"An exception to a rule will be declared by courts when the case
is not an isolated instance, but general in its character and the
existing rule does not square with justice. Under such circumstances, a court will, if free from restraint of some statute, declare
a rule that will meet the full intendment of the law." 25
The Baxter case goes on to cite Thomas v. Winchester, 26 one of the
earliest cases where the privity rule was ignored, and proceeds to say,
"The rule in such cases does not rest upon contractual obligations, but rather on the principle that the original act of delivering
an article is wrong, when, because of the lack of those qualities
which the manufacturer represented it as having, the absence of
which could not be readily detected by the consumer, the article
is not safe for the purpose for which the consumer would ordinarily use it." 21
24

168 Wash. 456 at 460-461, quoting 75 Wash. 622 at 624.

25

75 Wash. 622 at 629, quoted in 168 Wash. at 461.
26
6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852). This is the case which, as Judge
Cardozo said in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., laid the foundation of this branch
of the law. A drug dealer labeled beladonna as extract of dandelion and a retail druggist
sold it to the plaintiff as such. The retail purchaser was permitted to recover from
the party not in privity (evidently a wholesaler or manufacturer) who had mislabeled
it. The theory of the case was not warranty or deceit but negligence. This case happened
to deal with a substance "imminently dangerous" and there was for some time a
tendency to confine the right of recovery to such substances. The full complement of
exceptions indicated in Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., quoted in note l 2, supra,
did not develop at once. The slow development following this precendent was therefore
probably due to the particular circumstances of the Thomas case, but the opinion
uses language indicating a broader view of the whole problem of liability without
privity (6 N. Y. 397 at 409-410): "In the present case, the sale [by the defendant]
of the poisonous article was made to a dealer in drugs, and not to a consumer; the
injury, therefore, was not likely to fall on him, or on his vendee, who was also a dealer;
but much more likely to be visited on a remote purchaser, as actually happened. The
defendant's negligence put human life in imminent danger. Can it be said, that there
was no duty on the part of the defendant to avoid the creation of that danger, by the
exercise of greater caution? or that the exercise of that caution was a duty only to his
immediate vendee, whose life was not endangered? The defendant's duty arose out of
the nature of his business, and the danger to others incident to its mismanagement."
27
168 Wash. 456 at 462, 463.
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It was decided that the catalogues furnished by the manufacturer
should be admitted to show the representations by the manufacturer
that the windshield would not shatter. "Appellant ..• had the right
to rely on the representations made by [ the manufacturer] even though
there was no privity of contract."
Again, in the opinion on the second appeal the court seems almost
to treat the whole case as founded on deceit, and in this connection it
is made evident that the court is content to rest the result on considerations quite apart from negligence. 28 It is said:
28

If the Baxter case is to be regarded as founded on deceit the plaintiff was
fortunate to find himself before the Washington court. This is one of the states which
does not demand that the defendant shall have been guilty of a conscious lie in order
to be liable for deceit. McDaniel v. Crabtrees, 143 Wash. 168, 254 P. 1091 (1927).
This court has definitely adopted the rule that, if a person states as true material facts
susceptible of knowledge to one who relies and acts thereon to his injury, he cannot
defeat recovery for the injury caused thereby by showing that he did not know his
representations were false or that he believed them to be true. "This," says the note on
Baxter v. Ford Co., in 18 CORNELL L. Q. 455 at 449 (1933), "is ••• general enough
• • • to cover the principal case. The facts as to the glass in the windshield were certainly susceptible of knowledge by the Ford Co., and the plaintiff relied thereon to
his injury."
This question whether the plaintiff, in cases like Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,
does in fact rely on the manufacturer's representations may present some difficulty.
How is the plaintiff suing a manufacturer to show that he did in fact rely on such
representations as are found in the advertising of the product in question? This is a
question of fact and an illusive one. If the plaintiff's own testimony is to be admitted;
as it is in these days, it is quite likely that counsel will be able to coach their clients
to testify up to any rule of law about the necessity of showing this "reliance" which
the courts may evolve. The plaintiff's mental processes leading up to the decision to
buy the article, car or what not, are known only to himself and perhaps his family or
such other close friends as will almost invariably be biased witnesses. The plaintiff alone
knows what weight the shatterproof glass representation had in his decision to buy the
car he did buy, rather than some other. However, the law of deceit does not require that
plaintiff shall have relied entirely upon defendant's representations. It is enough if he
relied upon them in part. The question of reliance, therefore, is a question of fact, and
if there is a case made for a jury, plaintiff is surely entitled to instructions that if
defendant's representations did play a part in causing him to act, that is enough.
In actions sounding in contract there is much authority that advertisements of
the seller are a part of the contract of sale and may constitute a part of the warranty
collateral thereto. If the case is on the theory of deceit with the questions of privity and
scienter aside, the rule as to reliance should be no different. See 28 A.L.R. 991 ( I 924),
in which are collected cases holding that, where a salesman points out statements in
advertising material, it is proper for the purchaser to testify that he relied on the advertisements. This is, of course, not so freely allowed where the buyer is experienced and
informed in regard to the goods which are the subject of the sale, but where, as in the
Baxter case, the plaintiff was allowed to testify as to his total unfamiliarity with safety
glass, his general testimony as to reliance should clearly be material.
See Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 338-339, 140 N. E.
n8 (1922), wherein Wanamaker, J., stated: "It may be urged that this is a sub-
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"Indeed, it would seem that whether there was any better make of
shatter-proof glass manufactured by anyone at that time would be
wholly immaterial, under the law as decided by us on the former
appeal, since it was the duty of appellant to know that the representations made to purchasers were true. Otherwise, it should not
have made them. If a person states as true material facts susceptible of knowledge to one who relies and acts thereon to his injury,
if the representations are false, it is immaterial that he did not
know they were false, or that he believed them to be true. • • •
It has become almost axiomatic that false representations inducing
a sale or contract constitute fraud in law." 29
The portions quoted from these two opinions in the case of Ba:cter
v. Ford Motor Co. seem to the writer the most significant, but they
still 'do not make it entirely clear that the decision is based on the
adoption of any one definite theory which can be reconciled with the
general requirement of the law of 'sales calling for privity of contract.
This case has been noted in several law reviews. 80 The best of these
notes, in the Cornell Law Quarterly,81 suggests four grounds on which
stantial modification of the old doctrine of car,eat emptor, let the buyer beware. Is it
not high time, however, that that doctrine should be somewhat modified; at least that
it should have no higher place in the business life of a nation than the companion doctrine, 'let the seller beware'? There is entirely too much disregard of law and truth
in the business, social and political world of today•••• It is time to hold men to their
primary engagements to tell the truth and observe the law of common honesty and
fair dealing. Such a change, in my judgment, would not be so much in the line of
revolution as in the line of reasonable reform. Honest men need not fear it; dishonest
men should be kept in fear of it."
29
179 Wash. 123 at 128, 35 P. (2d) 1090 at 1092. Professor Williston uses
almost the same expression in his article, "Liability for Honest Misrepresentation," 24
HARV. L. REV. 415 at 419 ( l 9 I l) : "At the present day it is law, nearly, if not quite,
everywhere where the common law prevails, that any representation of fact as to the
quality of goods made for the apparent purpose of inducing the buyer to purchase
them amounts to a warranty."
The difference is that Professor Williston is speaking of warranty, which, as we
have seen is not generally an effective remedy in recent times without privity of contract. This court is talking about fraud in that loose way in which courts so often do,
in that undefined sense in which they so often use it in aid of a variety of other concepts, such as deceit, warranty, estoppel, rescission, cancellation, reformation of instruments, constructive trusts, quasi-contract and others which do not come to mind at the
moment. See also l WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed., § 197 (1924).
llO 46 HARV. L. REV. 161 (1933); 81 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 94 (1932); 7 WASH.
L. REV. 351 (1933); 18 CoRN. L. Q. 445 (1933); 7 RocKY MT. L. REV. 221
( 1935).
31 18 CoRN. L. Q. 445 (1933). The reader of this paper is urged to read this
note. It contains a better discussion of the theoretical basis of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.
than has been undertaken in this paper.
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the decision might have been put, but does not definitely state which
one it believed the court to have adopted. These four grounds are:

r. That warranty historically was a tort action not depending
on the existence of contract relations between the parties.32
2. An extension of the idea of MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co. to include the concept that non-shatterable glass is imminently dangerous. 83
3. Deceit; this is simple enough in a state like Washington
which does not require a showing of conscious fraud ( scienter) .34
Perhaps the most difficult element for the plaintiff to establish
on this theory is that of reliance.85 The Baxter case seems practically to have taken reliance for granted.
4. An extension of the doctrine of warranty to the effect that it
runs with personal property as covenants of warranty run with
land, or that this situation is one calling for a third party beneficiary warranty.86
The University of Pennsylvania Law Review 37 interprets Baxter
v. Ford as an innovation in the law of warranty and as being in accord
with the theory of Professor Williston that representation should be
made the basis of strict liability. It also suggests that, leaving aside the
matter of scienter, liability for misrepresentation is strictly imposed
by much authority. It is also suggested in the same note that there is
a close analogy to the strict liability88 imposed on persons engaged in
extra-hazardous activities.
"The buyer's unfamiliarity with the complicated mechanics of
manufacture leaves him dependent upon the honesty of the manuSee sources referred to in note 5, supra.
The note in 18 CoRN. L. Q. 445 (1933) points out as the most serious obstacle
to this, "that a car with ordinary windshield glass is not in its nature imminently dangerous. . •• Under such a strong pronouncement of public sentiment [ as statutes requiring it] a court may well justify a theory that furnishing a car without shatter-proof
glass is furnishing an imminently dangerous vehicle." The present writer has not made
a check to determine how many states now require this type of glass by statute, but the
reader well knows that nearly all states do have such legislation.
84 See note 28, supra; also Bohlen, "Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or
Warranty,'' 42 HARV. L. REv. 733 at 738 (1929).
85 Note 28, supra.
86 l WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed., § 244 (a) (1924); VoLD, SALES, §§ 152, 153
(1931), and see especially cases cited page 475; Perkins, "Unwholesome Food as a
Source of Liability,'' 5 lowA L. BuL. 6, 86 (1919-1920).
37 81 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 94 (1932).
38 Bohlen, "Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty," 42 HARv.
L. REv. 733 at 741 (1929).
·
32
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facturer's representations. An injury due to reliance on such misstatements might well be compared to an injury caused by the
carrying on of a dangerous occupation.... this type of protection
should not be withheld from the consumer. . . . The modern
manufacturer no longer requires the protection his predecessors
enjoyed. The burden should fall upon him who can best distribute
its weight." 39
The Harvard Law Review 40 looks upon the case as an extension
to other chattels of the well established exception to the doctrine
of privity which has hitherto been confined to food-stuffs. All the
comments applaud the decision and in effect say, "why not?" So also,
the writers of treatises and periodicals generally point out that the doctrine of privity in such cases, having crept into the law with the
development of the action of assumpsit and having perhaps served a
purpose in assisting the development of industry, is in any event no
longer necessary under the requirements of modern social justice and
should be dropped. 41
The writer has discovered two other shatter-proof windshield cases.
In Bird v. Ford Motor Co. 42 suit was brought against the manufacturer
by a passenger in an automobile who was injured when the shatterproof windshield was broken in a collision. The complaint alleged
negligence in that proper tests by the maker would have disclosed that
the shatter-proof glass was defective. It was also alleged that
this glass was imminently dangerous when used in automobiles. Defendant moved to dismiss. His argument, so far as disclosed in the
report, seems to turn largely on lack of privity. It was held that the
complaint stated a cause of action under the doctrine of MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co. This court also said by way of dictum that the
plaintiff could not recover for breach of warranty.
81 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 94 at 95, note 6 (1932).
46 HARV. L. REV. 161 (1932).
41 Note the tone on which these periodical comments close. 46 HARV. L. REV.
16 I at I 62 ( 193 2): "where, as in modern advertising, the defendant addresses representations to the purchaser which induce a sale tending to benefit the former, the mere
fact that the immediate seller is a third party should be immaterial."
81 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 94 at 95: "Apart from any such classification, however,
the court in recognizing the demands which the exigencies of changing economic conditions make upon the law, reached a decision which is at once socially just and in
harmony with the best legal thought."
18 CoRN. L. Q. 445 at 451 (1933): "The court in the principal case .•• on
this basis is declaring a new doctrine, but one which accords with the needs of modern
economic society."
42 (D. C. N. Y. 1936) 15 F. Supp. 590.
89
40
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In Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co. 48 it was held in the federal
district court that there could be no recovery by the subvendee, who
was injured by the breaking of a shatter-proof windshield, from the
maker of the car or from the maker of the glass. The plaintiff in this
case declared on the theory of warranty, the complaint evidently having been drawn on the basis of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co. The court
said that in no case except that, "has it been held that any one other
than the vendor, no matter what his relation to the parties, is liable to
respond in damages for a misstatement or misrepresentation as to the
qualities of an article sold, except in an action for fraud or deceit." 44
It is then stated that the Uniform Sales Act limits warranty to an
action between vendor and vendee. The court admits there is merit in
the plaintiff's argument that modern conditions make it reasonable that
a manufacturer who broadcasts his representations to the general public
by advertising should be responsible to members of the public influenced by such advertising. However, this judge is one of those who
think that when the ancient formulas will not do justice, the persons
wronged must await for action by the legislature.45 This is a familiar
(D. C. Ill. 1935) 15 F. Supp. 57.
15 F. Supp. 57 at 58.
45 This attitude upon the part of courts is evasive of the judicial responsibility
which the common law implicitly imposes upon the judge to make the law serve the
ends and needs of justice in a changing world. It has been the boast of the common
law that it possesses the flexibility to accomplish this end. It is impossible to imagine
legislation which will anticipate the innumerable variety of situations which might arise.
Thus, adequate provision for handling such cases would be attained only after considerable experiment by the legislature in passing statutes and by the courts in interpreting them. Legislation of this sort would doubtless be opposed by powerful lobbies
of manufacturers able to enlist the further support of publishers who would have an
interest based on the expectation of advertising. Local dealers, as a part of the manufacturers' distributing system, would be susceptible to the influence of these manufacturers in securing their influence in turn with their local legislators. Then, too, it is not
beyond imagination that counsel for manufacturers might devise contract agreements
which would defeat the purpose of such statutes, Only the courts, on the job all the
time and alert to effectuate social justice, can stop the gaps.
Witness the device by which the Goodyear Company has been able to evade
practicable responsibility in a very considerable class of claims as illustrated in McLean
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 150, cert. denied
299 U. S. 600, 57 S. Ct. 193 (1936). It appears that all this company's tires are
manufactured by an Ohio corporation which in turn owns a Delaware corporation having
the same officers and directors to which it sells all its tires. The Delaware corporation
then does business with dealers throughout the country. In this case it was conceded
that the manufacturer would be liable for the damage occasioned by the bursting of
a defective tire. The plaintiff sued the Delaware company which was doing business
in Texas, and having learned of the business set-up involved, he sought to amend his
complaint to include the manufacturer. It was held, and correctly, in view of the
48

44
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note. So many opinions end with this suggestion, so many judges seem
unaffected by the history of the common law and how it has grown. So
many courts seem to forget or ignore that it is their function first of all
to decide cases and only very secondarily to write opinions reconciling
those decisions with what they consider to be weight of precedent.
The statement in the Chanin case as to the state of the authorities
aside from the Baxter case ignores the food cases which have allowed
recovery with privity and without negligence. In the Circuit Court of
Appeals, 46 this decision was affi,rmed because the court thought there
could be no warranty and because there could be no deceit without
scienter.
Whether these cases be approached from the standpoint of negligence or of warranty or even of a strict liability, it is not enough that
the subvendee or other user was hurt or that the car was not what
it was represented to be. There must be some connection. As Professor
Bohlen has said, "The stream of liability can flow only through a
channel of duty and its breach." 47 Causation is an element essential
to awarding damages on any theory. The formula used to express this
requirement has been that of "proximate cause." But as pointed out
by several recent writers,48 the essential behind this is not the matter of
causation in fact, but duty, as Professor Bohlen's words above suggest.
A leading recent case which illustrates this especially well is Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. 49 Justice Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals, there reduced the problem to one of
duty. Another case which handles this problem particlularly well is
Mahoney v. Beatman. 50 The court therein discusses the confusion which
has resulted from the effort to frame a complicated rule of proximate
cause, and after referring to many articles by learned writers who have
attempted each in his own fashion to elaborate a rule or set of rules,
fearful and wonderful body of law with which we deal with corporate personality, that
the Ohio corporation was not subject to jurisdiction in that action. In a case against
a concern of this sort the plaintiff must either have a jurisdictional amount of claim
to get into federal court or bring his action in a distant state. On the whole question
of manufacturers' liability, it will have been noticed by the reader ~at the federal
courts are, to say the least, on the conservative side when it comes to extending the
boundaries of responsibility.
48 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 889.
47 Bohlen, "Fifty Years of Torts," 50 HARV. L. REv. 1225 at 1227 (1937).
48 GREEN, RATIONALE OF PRQXIMATE CAUSE (1927); GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY
(1930); HARPER, ToRTS, §§ xo8, no (1933).
49 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 58 A. L. R. 1253 (1928).
no IIO Conn. 184, 147 A. 762, 66 A. L. R. u21 (1929).
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accepts the one stated by Jeremiah Smith 51 as the only workable one
and as sufficiently simple for practical use in guiding a jury. The rule
as stated by Smith is quoted in the Mahoney cases as follows:
"To constitute such causal relation between defendant's tort and
plaintiff's damage as will suffice to maintain an action of tort, the
defendant's tort must have been a substantial factor in producing
the damage complained of." 52
This is the formula which is regarded by the Connecticut court, in
Mahoney v. Beatman, as being one which cannot be reduced to lower
terms and in applying which
"the court must determine whether the jury would be justified
in finding that there is a negligent act and that there is a causal
connection between that act and an injury•.•. The court must
reach the conclusion by itself answering the question, Does the
evidence reasonably justify the submission to the jury of the question, 'Was defendant's conduct a substantial factor in producing
plaintiff's injuries?'" 58
As applied to the present subject of discussion this means: Does the
manufacturer of automobiles or of safety glass windshields owe a duty
to subvendees or other users of such automobiles that glass used therein
and represented to be shatter-proof shall be so? Shall the maker be
liable for injuries which result when it turns out not to be shatterproof under the impact of stones thrown against it by other cars? This
is a problem for the court. Courts must define duties wherever they
find those duties, whether in contracts, statutes or common law. The
court must ask itself this question, "Is there a rule of law which protects this plaintiff under these circumstances against this hazard?" 54
If the court sends such a case to a jury, it has, whether it knows it or
not, ipso facto recognized such a duty. By sending the case to the jury,
the court in effect says to the jury, "If you find there was a causal
relation between plaintiff's damage and defendant's conduct, that is,
if you find that defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing
plaintiff's damage you may find a verdict for plaintiff."
It might be argued that the passing car which threw the stone
against Baxter's windshield was an intervening cause. This is not the
n Smith, "Legal Cause in Actions of Tort," 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, 223, 303
at 309 (19n-1912).
52 Mahoney v. Beatman, IIO Conn. 184 at 195, 147 A. 762 (1929).
53 I IO Conn. at 196.
54 GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927).
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place for an extended discussion of the various rules which have been
formulated by various writers for dealing with concurrent causes.
But reference should be made to Mahoney v. Beattnan, which has
approved Dean Green's views on this:
"Green . . • expresses the opinion that intervening agencies while
important in determining liability have little pertinency in a discussion of the causal relation of the injuries resulting from the
wrongful act to that act. This we believe to be a true exposition
of the effect of an intervening agency." 55
Mr. Bohlen throws more light on this question of causal relation in a
way which seems to the writer pertinent. In discussing Baxter v. Ford
Motor Co., he says,5°
"If the term 'proximate' cause is recognized as a convenient term
to describe that causal relation which for one reason or another
the law regards as sufficient to entail responsibility, no great damage is done. • .. The very term 'proximate' carries with it the implication that the force which is nearest in the chain of causation
is peculiarly, if not exclusively, responsible for all ensuing harm.
From this follows a natural tendency to regard the later of two
successive wrongdoers, whose misconduct is, therefore, the nearest
in operation to the injury of the plaintiff, as not merely predominantly but solely responsible.... The earlier of two wrongdoers, even though his wrong has merely set the stage on which
the later wrongdoer acts to plaintiff's injury, is in most jurisdictions no longer relieved from responsibility merely because the
later act of the other wrongdoer has been a means by which his
own misconduct was made harmful."
This point of view is apposite in the Baxter case, where in the manufacturer's earlier wrong, in putting in the "shatter-proof" glass which
did shatter, was made harmful by the impact of the stone hurled by
a passerby as to whom there is not even a suggestion of wrongdoing.
If the glass had shattered in a collision brought about by the negligence of another driver, the same analysis should apply.
There are other cases of injuries due to the failure of automobiles
to come up to the reasonable expectations of subvendees in respect of
parts other than glass windshields. When a defect in materials or the
process of assembling an automobile causes injury to its user, his right
of action against the maker is clear enough if he can establish negli55
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gence, either in jurisdictions which follow MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co. or in the many other states which recognize a defective automobile
as an imminently dangerous thing to be included in the well established exceptions to Winterbottom v. Wright.6 1 Recovery on either
of these grounds, however, calls for allegations and proof of negligence. It is obviously a difficult thing for the plaintiff to show anything
of the practices in the factory where the car was made as to the care
used in the construction of the parts or in their assembly.Gs Evidence
GT These

are stated in note 1 2, supra.
v. Buick Co., 358 Ill. 507, 193 N. E. 529 (1934), reversing 267
Ill. App. 68 (1932), a car about a month old while being driven by the owner at
about 30 miles per hour suddenly went in the ditch when the brake was applied,
greatly damaging the car and permanently injuring the owner. At the garage where
the car was towed it was found that certain cotter pins in the brake assembly were
missing. The defendant introduced extensive testimony as to various inspections in the
course of assembling the car and preparing it for delivery. The court states the an
unsecured cotter pin would be negligence but says the plaintiff must show that such
a condition was due to defendant's negligence and makes a great deal of the point that
the cotter pin may have been tampered with between the time of the accident and the
time it was discovered in the garage to be missing.
Cases of this sort seem to show that in many jurisdictions in the present state of
the law an injured car owner has no redress if his defectively built car goes to pieces,
however new it may be. In the first place, warranties by dealers are so worded as to
exclude any practicable responsibility on their part, as was the case in Baxter v. Ford
Motor Company; secondly, the manufacturer whose negligence cannot be directly
proved is sheltered behind the wall of privity from responsibility on any other ground.
It is submitted that this should not be. It is obviously impossible to meet the standards
set up in this case. What can the subvendee of the car possibly show in any case as
to factory procedure? The defendant's witnesses will invariably describe a procedure
which sounds most painstakingly careful. But slips do occur. There seem to be two
ways to meet the obvious requirements of justice in such situations: first, to hold that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies; or second, to allow the injured party to sue
upon the theory of warranty. It will be objected that this is an improper application
of res ipsa loquitur, because the automobile was not under the defendant's control at
the time of the accident. To this it may be said that the problem under fire is not
the operation of the car but the manner of its construction, which was entirely under
the manufacturer's control. The defendant may testify that he usually follows a certain
procedure of inspections and he can say no more than that to the best of his knowledge
this was done and that no one else touched such' things as the cotter pins, in this case,
before the car was iielivered. If this is competent evidence it should be equally competent for plaintiff to testify that the mechanism was to the best of his knowledge
untouched after delivery to him and he should be permitted to show that the condiion as discovered after the accident was the sort that would naturally result in such
behavior by the car. Let it go to the jury on that basis and it will not be conclusive
against the plaintiff, whatever happened to the cotter pin after the accident. Of course
this could not well be permitted after a car had been tinkered with by a mechanic other
than the manufacturer's own representative at· least.
As to warranty as a basis for shifting the burden where it can be distributed and
so can best be borne, enough has already been said to indicate the writer's opinion that
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on such matters and the circumstances under which the defect was
created are both under the control of the defendant. Testimony must
necessarily come from the maker's employees, who are likely to be
hostile witnesses for the plaintiff. He can hardly expect to be able to
show more than those generalities which are the prerequisites for applying res ipsa loquitur.
A complete study of the judicial process in those cases which allow
the plaintiff to get before a jury without privity of contract, would
involve an extended investigation of the use of res ipsa loquitur and an
attempt to differentiate as to whether on any other basis the plaintiff is
this is not going too far or doing too great violence to the not even now symmetrical
pattern of the law. Tradition favors it, statutes do not forbid it, social justice requires
it, Baxter v. Ford Motor Co. has done it, may other courts profit by the example.
There are other cases with reference to automobiles going to pieces. In Goullon
v. Ford Motor Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1930) 44 F. (2d) 310, where the steering wheel
of a tractor crumbled in the driver's hand, letting him fall under the wheels, and it
was shown that the steering wheel was an experiment in cheap construction in that
there was no steel core within the composition rim, it was held that there was sufficient evidence of negligence to take the case to the jury. On the other hand, Davlin
v. Henry Ford & Son, (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) 20 F. (2d) 317, where a tractor seat
broke off and threw the driver under the wheels, it was held there was not a case for
the jury. See also Morrissey v. Mazzie, 249 App. Div. 788, 292 N. Y. S. 455 (1936);
Dillingham v. Chevrolet Co., (D. C. Okla. 1936) 17 F. Supp. 615.
The reader's attention is called to the very recent case of Reusch v. Ford Motor
Co., decided in the state of Washington, September 1, 1938, 82 P. (2d) 544. In this
case the plaintiff, owner of a motor truck manufactured by the defendant, while driving
it became mired and the truck was tilted to one side. The truck cau&:ht fire. The
plaintiff leaped to save himself, tripped over a log and suffered injuries from his fall.
The plaintiff based his case against the defendant manufacturer on the theory that this
was all due to negligence in manufacture and design of the truck, resulting in leakage
of the gas tank, and in certain other connections whereby sparks from the muffler and
exhaust reached the leaking gas. It was held that the defendant was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. The Washington court refers to its decision in Baxter v. Ford Motor
Company but seems to put the decision in this case on the ground that an automobile
is not inherently dangerous unless negligently constructed and further seems to hold
as a matter of law that gasoline leaks are not due to negligence. The court cites several
of the well-known cases referred to in this article, particularly the federal cases, which
appear to the present writer to be irreconcilable with its own position in Baxter v. Ford
Motor Company. It is also pointed out that the poison food cases are not analogous to
the situation presented in the case at bar.
It is submitted that this case could and should have been decided, if the result
reached was the one desired by the court, on other grounds. Perhaps also there was
contributory negligence. It is also arguable that the real problem in this case, as to
whether the defendant should be liable for the personal injury to the defendant when
he fell on the ground, was one of causation. It would also seem reasonable to expect that
the question of warranty, which was apparently a factor in Baxter v. Ford Motor Company, should have received more attention here. However, the report does not show
whether or not the record on appeal raised this point.
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relieved of the task of making detailed and direct proof on how negligence may have crept into any of the multiple operations which terminated in marketing the offending automobile. This cannot be undertaken in this paper. Nevertheless, it seems to the writer that without a
liberal employment of this rule or a free use of warranty or some
other concept which will dispense with privity ( as it has been dispensed
with in the cases which proceed on the negligence theory), progress
in imposing the hazard of unsafe automobiles on the manufacturing
group, where it can be best distributed, must be disappointingly slow.
As has already been suggested, the most substantial progress in this
direction has been in the food cases. There are indeed few instances
nowadays where a consumer injured by improperly prepared, packed
or preserved food products, may not make out a jury case, if he lays
his complaint in terms of the local law. Res ipsa loquitur has been very
freely allowed in such cases, and in not a few states 59 there are cases
which say there is an implied warranty for the consumer. 00 There are
also the many cases where it has been possible to sustain an action in
deceit upon the basis of false representations by manufacturers, especially in the matter of labels. 61 In reference to medicines and various
chemical substances and mechanical devices, very often a failure to
warn users of dangerous qualities in the product furnishes sufficient
proof of negligence.
When we come to a case like Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., where
none of the old familiar formulas will quite do the trick, the court is
thrown up·on its own resources. In such a predicament a court which is
determined to control the process of judgment in the light of its own ·
intelligence and its own conception of social needs and social policy
will find a way. Again I turn to Karl Llewellyn's casebook, in which
he says in his introduction:62
"For the court has peculiar means at its disposal to adjust a rule
to a case it will not fit. The court can always, and it does often,
59 Note 18, supra. There are also cases which suggest the third party beneficiary
theory. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, among those cited in the above note 18, seems
to be decided on this basis.
60 Note 17, supra.
61 Bohlen, "Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their Immediate
Vendees," 45 L. Q. REv. 343 at 349 (1929); Bohlen, "Landlord and Tenant,"
35 HARV. L. REv. 633 (1922); BoHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAw oF ToRTS 202 at 230
237, 241 (1926); Feezer, "Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors," IO MINN.
L. REv. l at 4, note 8 (1925); 17 A. L. R. 707 (1922); 39 A. L. R. 999 (1925);
63 A. L. R. 349 (1929); 88 A. L. R. 534 (1934); r II A. L. R. 1250 (1937).
62 LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAw OF SALES, p. x (1930).
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'save the rule' by 'construing' the facts into a pattern that bears
no relation to reality; and the facts brought out in dissenting
opinions leave no doubt that this is often and deliberately done
in the interest of the court's view of justice in the particular case."
A little farther on he continues:
"Again, we must recognize on the one hand the opinion is often
a mere justification after the event, a mere making plausible to
the legal audience, of a decision reached before the opinion was
begun, a decision the real reasons of which we may never learn.
And on the other hand~ we must remember that the opinion may,
in any given case, reveal the true course of decision; and that
in any event it will be a factor of power in further decisions of the
same or other courts."
Again, I say, the court will find a way. It can invoke any of the
various formulas which have been mentioned in this paper and others.
It can narrow or broaden their meaning and application to effect its
underlying purpose.
It is the writer's opinion that we shall not be given a great number
of opportunities to observe whether the liberal recognition of responsibility, as imposed in Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., will be followed in
reference to the specific hazard which appeared in that case, viz.,
misrepresented safety glass. Either this case, or other reasons unknown,
appear to have modified the advertising in regard to safety glass in
automobiles. The emphasis in the recent advertisements seems to be
more upon qualities other than "shatter-proofness," such as clearness
and freedom from distortion. Perhaps this is because the public is now
so thoroughly innoculated with the idea that safety glass is shatterproof that it is no longer considered necessary to mention that supposed
quality. In other words, if one wishes to sue for injury due to shattering of glass in a 1938 automobile it is unlikely that the admissibility
of such circulars as were offered in the Baxter case will be a question
because of the modified content of more recent advertising.
However, the question may still arise as to the responsibility of
automobile makers who do not use glass which is really shatter-proof.
Perhaps the widely extant statute requiring safety glass will be interpreted as making it negligence per se, or at least evidence of negligence,
for a manufacturer to install any other kind. 63 Even without such a
statute, the comµion law may adopt a rule that safety glass is the only
68
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(1933). See also note 33, supra.
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compliance with a standard of care for the manufacture of automobiles,
either by allowing juries so to find or by making its use a minimum standard of care as a matter of law. On the other hand, it may be required
merely that he use the best and most nearly shatter-proof glass that
the market affords.
However, the issues suggested by such a case as Baxter v. Ford
Motor Co. are broader than the limited question of manufacturer's
liabilities with reference to shatter-proof glass~ A decision like this
opens up the whole problem whether manufacturers shall be held
liable for injury when products do not live up to the representati"ons
in advertising. It is even broader than that. It suggests the possibility
that makers of all sorts of products will be held responsible, as manufacturers and packers of foodstuff are now held liable, without showing
negligence. There is here involved the question of fair trade as between vendor and consumer. When one producer runs down another's
product by means of advertising, by cutting prices and by various other
practices, the party aggrieved may invoke all sorts of legal concepts,
common-law rules, statutory and administrative regulations which are
calculated to promote what is called fair trade as between competitors.
What protection is there for the consumer beyond a few statutes relating
to particular commodities, especially foods and drugs?
It is said that when one cigarette maker urged the public to use
its brand instead of a sweet, the candy trade was able to get legal help
as against unfair trade. When the user of a manufactured article suffers
because the goods are not as advertised or as normally and humanly
expected to be, he is confronted with the folklore of early Victorian
rules and concepts about privity of contract, subject to some exceptions
which we have been talking about in this paper. Must the consuming
public wait upon legislation, which if it comes will be piecemeal and
cannot be expected to be drawn with such foresight as to anticipate and
protect against all of the innumerable situations which may arise?
If such legislation does come, it will mean that litigation must drag
out a long course before interpretation will be far enough advanced
to assure whether the desired end has been accomplished.
The common law has the power and the flexibility to handle problems of this sort. Is it too much to ask that the courts will recognize
their power and responsibility to handle these questions as they arise
and to decide cases as cases? If the results can be reconciled with a
symmetrical pattern of precedent, so much to the good. That will make
the decisions more readily acceptable to the professional group, but,
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if some of the decisions seem from the point of view of the strict conceptualist to be inconsistent with something else, that also will have
to be accepted. Probably every decision is disagreed with, at least by
counsel for the losing party.
American courts have repeatedly refused to accept and follow many
doctrines of the common law which were unquestioned in England.
These courts have frequently assigned the reason that these doctrines
did not fit the conditions in this country.6' Place makes a difference.
What may work well under one set of conditions, present in one place,
may be quite unsuitable under different conditions. Likewise time makes
a difference. Privity was a simple rule, easy of application, and probably worked on the whole very well in the days when things were
usually made to order for the consumer. It does not fit modern conditions. The innumerable cases which avoid using the rule of privity
by the well known exceptions admit that. Other cases are found where
the courts throw up their hands in despair and tell the plaintiff he must
go to the legislature. Why all this effort to evade the principle? Why
not ignore it, why not recognize it for what it is, a ghost from the
past, and formulate a new concept that will lead directly to the result
which is admittedly in harmony with modem conditions and will effectuate an enlightened contemporary social policy?
6 ' Many rules of the common law relating to property, particularly the great body
of that relating to incorporeal hereditaments, never found a place in this country. A
homely illustration is the refusal of the states from Ohio westward to follow the English
rules as to liability for trespassing live stock. The common law held the owner strictly
liable. The western states refused to so hold and required the cultivator to fence them
out or take the risk. The reason stated was the unsuitability of the common law to the
nature of the country. In a great many states a hunting license is a defense to trespass
on lands not posted as prescribed by statute, and in the early days of the west the
hunter even without a license was not liable for trespass. Americans do not feel as
sensitive about "poaching" as the English.

